An outside-in view of deep tech commercialization across the Atlantic
I currently advise a founder affiliated with CERN. His venture’s science is first-rate and offers deep energy technology that would impress some of the leading US venture investors. This founder also has solid funding options, including substantial EU non-dilutive support, a clear regulatory pathway in Europe, and institutional credibility.
But when this founder turns to the US market, which is going to be critical for scaling the business, none of that really counts. Their funding which is patient, milestone-driven, non-dilutive-first, may not necessarily map cleanly onto what US angels and venture investors expect. Also, the vocabulary is different as are the timelines, and even defining commercialization “traction.”
This is what I would call the outside-in view of European deep tech commercialization, and it’s different from US models and its underlying ecosystem. I’m not criticizing the European model; it has real strengths in dealing with capital-intensive science and much of its tech is underrated. But it’s important to be honest about how US investors read European spinouts, where the gaps are, and what founders need to do to bridge them effectively.
What US Investors Actually See
Let’s start with perspective. When a typical US investor looks at a European university spinout, they’re pattern-matching against a template that was built in the US. What does this look like? A founder who owns a meaningful equity stake; a cap table that’s clean, and hasn’t been diluted by institutional complexity; a commercialization timeline that runs 18–36 months; and a go-to-market that starts in the US or can be adapted to it quickly.
European spinouts often don’t fit this template because the operating environment is different.
The first difference is equity complexity. European TTOs, particularly at institutions like ETH Zurich, EPFL, Oxford, and Imperial, often retain larger equity positions than their US counterparts. Universities are often material shareholders, as are national funding bodies. US investors, particularly at seed stage, will look at this cap table before a single commercial milestone has been achieved, and discount this heavy ownership accordingly, if they are interested at all.
Second, there is a dependency on grants. This isn’t unique to Europe, as US spinouts regularly use NIH, NSF, and SBIR funding. The difference is proportion and duration. EU non-dilutive programs like Horizon Europe and EIC Accelerator are larger and longer than their US counterparts, and can often substitute for early equity rounds. A founder who has run four to six years on EU grants without private capital validation will face a question US investors don’t always ask of SBIR-funded peers: if this is a strong commercial opportunity, why hasn’t anyone written a check?
Third is market sequencing. European founders often plan to establish the business in Europe first and expand to the US later. US investors, unless they are focused solely on Europe, want to know when and how the US becomes the primary, or meaningful, market. A founder with a heavy EU-centric commercialization plan may struggle to raise capital in the US. There are US funds that actively seek European exposure, but they are the exception and typically operate at later stages.
Fourth, there is regulatory framing. European founders are often more comfortable talking about regulatory approval pathways (eg. CE marking, EMA, national frameworks such as MHRA in the UK or ANSM in France) than US commercial traction. US investors check that the science is veritable and will get regulatory clearance, but then quickly hone in on the commercialization logic.
None of this is insurmountable. But it does require European founders to learn a second “commercial” language and plan their outreach accordingly.
A Few Trans-Atlantic Spinouts
There are several examples of European spinouts that have successfully crossed into US funding and markets. Here are four cases worth studying:
- Wayve (UCL, autonomous driving) built its technical credibility in the UK but has a commercial story around global deployment from the start. When it raised $1 billion in 2024 (led by SoftBank, with Microsoft and NVIDIA participating) their pitch wasn’t “a British autonomous driving company” but a company building a foundation model approach to autonomy, which happened to be based in London. Note that the commercial thesis went beyond geography, with applicability everywhere.
- Graphcore (Bristol, AI chips) built deep relationships with US hyperscalers and understood that US market validation was a prerequisite for US capital. The company never achieved that validation at scale; SoftBank acquired it in 2024 after funding struggles. But the lesson is the same: a world-class technical product without a durable US commercial thesis runs out of runway.
- BioNTech (University of Mainz) is the most visible example of European deep science reaching global commercial scale. It was backed from early stages by private capital (notably the Strüngmann family office) not primarily by grants. The lesson is that the transition to US scale required a commercial partner (Pfizer) with US distribution, US regulatory credibility, and US market access.
- Climeworks (ETH Zurich, direct air capture) has a funding model that combines EU grants, US DOE support, and private equity in a structure that works because the company was explicit about sequencing. It took a hybrid approach from inception, locking in EU and US stakeholders.
What’s the common thread to all of these high-profile cases? Founders understood that US investors need a compelling US commercial story, not just a world-class scientific one. Then they built the narrative that supported it.
The Non-Dilutive Bridge
The CERN-affiliated founder I mentioned at the opening is at exactly this inflection point between funding and commercialization. The EU non-dilutive runway is substantial, science is proven, and the US market is the next step. However, his funding ideas need to change.
If EU non-dilutive funding is designed to de-risk his venture’s science, then US venture funding is designed to catalyze commercial development. To get there the founder needs to prove that the science is de-risked, the US commercial thesis is solid, and funding will support its execution, with specific milestones.
Moreover, this bridge has to be built in commercial, non scientific, language. For deep energy tech, it might mean landing a US pilot customer, a DOE partnership, or a licensing conversation with a US industrial player. For medtech, it might mean FDA pre-submission feedback alongside the CE mark. For AI or software, it might mean a US design partner agreement. But it will need something tangible.
Ultimately, US investors want to see that the founder has done the hard work of understanding the US market, not just the funding landscape. But many are likely going to assume, until proven otherwise, that the European founder understands how either works.
The TTO Factor
A final differentiating factor, specifically relating to university spin-outs, is how European TTOs differ from US TTOs.
The most active European TTOs such as Imperial College London’s Imperial Innovations (now Touchstone Innovations/IP Group), Oxford University Innovation, ETH Zurich’s ETH transfer, and EPFL’s Technology Transfer Office, operate with more institutional authority than many US counterparts. They often negotiate licensing terms, hold equity positions, and in some cases co-invest in spinouts directly, which I wrote about here. This is a key feature of the European model: founders get more structural support earlier, but often with a cap table that is more complicated before private investment arrives.
US investors who dig down into European spinout for the first time are often surprised by how much of the equity structure was pre-determined before the founder was in control. This could include onerous licensing fees, equity carve-outs, and milestone payments back to the university.
To clarify matters, founders should demand explicit clarity from their TTO, including what the cap table looks like at each funding stage, the types of rights the university retains, and whether there are any provisions that frighten off US investors. Investors need to understand the structure upfront so they can price it; if not, it’s an early red flag.
The better European TTOs, and there are genuinely some excellent ones, understand this and actively help founders prepare for US investor conversations. If yours doesn’t, you need to assume that responsibility.
The chart below illustrates why the conversation breaks down before it starts. US investors don’t just expect a different timeline, they discount the early stages entirely.
One Action
Most European founders can describe their technology in detail but very few can answer this question.
If you’re a European founder targeting the US market, write a single paragraph describing your US commercial thesis. Be concise: do not include your technology, funding history, or regulatory pathway. Focus only on who in the US buys your product or service, why they buy it, and what it costs. If you can’t write this paragraph, start here.
Note for TTO readers: European TTOs that want their spinouts to access US capital need to prepare founders for US investor expectations, not just licensing terms and equity structure. They need a commercial narrative. TTOs that excel at this can be a genuine competitive advantage for their institutions. The ones that don’t leave founders to figure it out alone; and that’s a gap Edunomix can help close.
The PhD Founder Brief is published weekly by Todd Maurer: founder of Edunomix, owner of VersatilePhD. Commercialization intelligence for research-backed ventures and the institutions that support them.
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Photo by Antonio Vivace on Unsplash